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Abstract
Authcoin is an alternative approach to the commonly used public key infrastructures such as central
authorities  and  the  PGP  web  of  trust.  It  combines  a  challenge  response-based  validation  and
authentication process  for domains, certificates, email accounts and public keys with the advantages
of a block chain-based storage system. As a result, Authcoin does not suffer from the downsides of
existing solutions and is much more resilient to sybil attacks.
Keywords: PGP, Authentication, Validation, Block Chain.
1 Introduction
Public key infrastructures (PKIs) are not only responsible for distributing and managing public keys,
but also for ensuring a correct association between a public key and its owner. The hierarchical trust
model  for  certificate  authentication  (commonly  used  by  Certificate  Authorities  (CA)  and  web
browsers) relies on hierarchically structured central authorities (Perlman, 1999), whereas the PGP1
web of trust (WoT) uses a decentralized approach (Zimmerman, 1994). Instead of relying on central
CAs, each user acts as an authority itself and ensures a number of bindings between (third) users and
their public keys. Several security incidents in recent years have proven that CAs are vulnerable due to
their centralized structure (Prins et al. 2011; Bugzilla, 2012; Espiner, 2012; Comodo Group, 2011). On
the other hand, the decentralized PGP WoT does not provide sufficient certainty that the information
stated in a public key is correct, since users do not carefully verify other users (missing incentives). In
addition, it is trivial for malicious users to generate large numbers of key pairs and create structures
which look like carefully verified keys without much effort.
Typically, PGP's WoT regards the following as criteria for trust:  1.)  Number of signatures on the
subject under investigation. 2.) Centrality of a node in the entire set of subjects. 3.) Timeline with
information when signatures  have been made (typically, signatures  should appear  during a  longer
period). 4.) Number of asymmetric trust relations within the WoT.
The basic idea is to increase the price for an attacker to pay for successfully manipulating the WoT.
The attacker either has to pay real money or deliver a proof of work, which is a computing task that
requires a sufficient amount of resources.
In this paper, we propose a new protocol called Authcoin which uses a flexible challenge-response
schema for validation and authentication (V&A) of public keys. Depending on the chosen challenges,
Authcoin can be used in various scenarios with customized security requirements and is not limited to
1In the following, “PGP” will be used as a synonym for all PGP compatible software.
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be used in combination with PGP keys for email communication (as known from the PGP WoT) or
website  certificates  (as  for  CAs).  In  addition,  the  protocol  utilizes  the  transparent,  fault  tolerant,
replicated and difficult to manipulate block chain (BC) concept (as known from Bitcoin (Nakamoto,
2008)) for storing data. As a result, Authcoin does not only provide a decentralized alternative to the
commonly used PKI systems, but is also more resilient to sybil attacks than current decentralized
approaches (as the PGP WoT). 
The paper starts with presenting the state of the art  and describes commonly used types of PKIs.
Section  3 provides a general description of the Authcoin protocol. Afterwards, Section  4 deals with
potential  threats  to  Authcoin,  how to mitigate  them and gives  more detailed explanations  on  the
challenge-response schema. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper and Section 6 provides an outlook
on future work.
2 State of the Art
Nowadays, there are two commonly used types of PKIs. The centralized system of CAs (Perlman,
1999)  and  its  decentralized  counterpart  the  PGP WoT  (Zimmerman,  1994).  Both  have  different
advantages and disadvantages which will be described in the following section. In addition, a third
approach, the Certcoin system (Fromknecht et al. 2014b) which has not been implemented yet, will be
introduced.
2.1 Certificate Authorities
Certificate  authorities  are  institutions  or  organizations  inside  a  network  which  are  treated  as
trustworthy by definition. They can sign individuals, organizations or another CA’s certificates. Users
who decide to trust a certain CA (and their decisions), also trust all individuals signed by this CA. The
result is a tree-like, hierarchical structure with the initial CA (Root-CA) at the top of the system. This
tree structure is also one of the biggest disadvantages of CAs since it introduces a single point of
failure. The whole trust-system collapses as soon as a Root-CA gets compromised or untrustworthy for
any reason. There have been several security incidents involving CAs in the last years. In 2011, an
attacker issued certificates for domains of large IT-companies such as Google, Yahoo and others using
an access to DigiNotar's (a Dutch CA) systems (Prins et al. 2011). As a consequence, DigiNotar's root
certificate  was  removed  from  most  browsers  and  the  company  went  bankrupt.  Another  incident
involved Trustwave Holdings. Trustwave operates a CA and issued a subordinate root certificate to a
customer which enabled the customer to issue certificates on its own. The customer's identity was
never  revealed  due  to  a  Non-Disclosure  Agreement  (Bugzilla,  2012;  Espiner,  2012).  Another
certificate incident of 2011 involved the CA Comodo (Comodo Group, 2011), where a compromised
reseller account was used to issue arbitrary certificates.
Similar security problems might also occur in case a national authority forces a CA to cooperate and
grant access to the CA's root certificates for surveillance reasons.
2.2 Web of Trust
In 1994 Phil Zimmerman described a decentralized counterpart to the centralized CA system: The PGP
WoT (Zimmerman, 1994). Instead of relying on a central authority, each user acts as an authority itself
and ensures a number of bindings between (third) users and their public keys. A successful verification
of a public key results in an unidirectional signature between the public key of the verifier (Alice) and
the verified user's (Bob) key. Such a signature is interpreted as a trust relation; Alice has successfully
verified the authenticity of Bob's  public key and therefore Alice decides to trust Bob's public key.
Users can decide to trust a key if it is signed by somebody they trust or if there exists a chain of trusted
signatures from their key to the targeted key. In contrast to the centralized CA system, the PGP WoT
has no central point of failure. Nevertheless, it suffers from several other downsides such as missing
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incentives and a lack of punishments in order to motivate its users to adhere to the verification rules
and contribute to the well being of the system.
It is also surprisingly trivial for malicious users to generate large numbers of keys and connect them in
such a way, that the resulting network looks like a group of trustful users.  Finally, as shown in a
previous study (Leiding and Dähn, 2016), about 40 percent of the PGP WoT's email addresses are dead
(not reachable any more) which makes us question the trustworthiness of signatures related to these
unreachable email addresses.
As a conclusion, we can state that the WoT in its current form is worthless except in cases where it
reflects direct trust relations.
2.3 Certcoin as an Alternative Approach
The Certcoin project (Fromknecht et al. 2014a; Fromknecht et al. 2014b) introduces an alternative
approach and shares some basic ideas with Authcoin.  Fromknecht et al. (2014a; 2014b) used “the
consistency guarantees provided by cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Namecoin (Namecoin, 2015)
to build a PKI that ensures identity retention” (Fromknecht et al. 2014b). Certcoin does not require a
central authority (similar  to the PGP WoT) and uses the Bitcoin BC and the resulting advantages
(decentralized,  difficult  to  manipulate,  distributed  replication,  fault  tolerance,  redundancy,
transparency, etc.).  The protocol  provides  methods for  public  key registration,  update,  revocation,
recovery, verification and lookup. So far, Certcoin has not been implemented. 
2.4 Our Contribution
Even though both, Certcoin and Authcoin, share the same underlying idea of a decentralized, BC-
based WoT there are still  major differences between them. Certcoin focuses on the combination of the
PGP WoT and the BC concept as well as the feature of identity retention, but not on the V&A process
itself or fighting malicious users. Authcoin combines the idea of a decentralized WoT, a fault tolerant,
difficult  to manipulate, replicated and transparent storage system (BC) and a (partially automated)
bidirectional  validation  and  authentication  process.  As  a  result,  it  is  much  more  difficult  for  an
adversary to introduce malicious key into the system or prevent the detection of such keys. Besides
that,  Authcoin  is  not  limited  to  PGP  keys,  but  can  also  be  utilized  for  validation  of  domains,
certificates, (email)-accounts or can be used in other similar scenarios.
3 Authcoin
The  following  section  provides  a  general  overview  on  Authcoin  itself,  its  challenge-response-
mechanism  and  further  important  concepts.  Eventual  security  issues  as  well  as  advantages  and
disadvantages of Authcoin will be discussed later (Section 4) in order to keep the basic explanations as
short as possible. As illustrated in Figure 1, we will first discuss the generation of a new key pair and
how to establish an initial binding between the key and its owner (Section 3.1). Afterwards, the formal
key validation (Section 3.2) as well as validation (Section 3.3) and authentication (Section 3.4) will be
introduced.  Later  parts  of  this  section  deal  with  key  revocation,  expiration,  recovery  and lookup
followed by a short overview on Authcoin's data storage (Section 3.8). Validation and authentication
requests (VARs) will be introduced later in Section 4.3.
Even though the following sections use examples based on PGP key pairs, Authcoin is not limited to
PGP and  therefore  most  examples  can  also  be  applied  to  other   public-key  cryptography-based
scenarios.
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Figure 1. General overview on Authcoin’s workflow
3.1 Generating a New Key Pair and Establishing an Initial Binding
As usual and known from the concept of the PGP WoT, each user generates a new key pair using a
local  PGP-compatible  client  and  adds  basic  information  (email,  name,  etc.)  to  the  key  pair.
Establishing  an  initial  binding  between  the  generated  key  pair  and  its  owner  is  crucial  for
authentication systems which rely on asymmetric cryptography. Traditional systems (e.g. PGP WoT)
rely on (domain)-names and email addresses to identify users. Unfortunately, both of them are easy to
fake and therefore it is trivial to create a public key for an arbitrary entity with a corresponding email
address (e.g. obama@whitehouse.gov).
All accumulated information are collected and stored in the BC as described later in Section 3.8 and
illustrated in Figure 1.
3.2 Formal Key Validation
Before the actual V&A, each involved public key is automatically checked for formal validity. The
protocol validates the following properties (which are all stated in a common PGP public key): Is the
key well formed (can PGP/GnuPG read the key as input)? Is the key length sufficient? Is the key still
valid or already expired? Has the key been revoked?
In case all involved keys pass the formal validation, the actual V&A process starts. If necessary the
mentioned example properties can be extended.
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3.3 Domain, Certificate and (Email)-Account Validation
Authcoin's process of validating a domain and the key (certificate) of the domain is similar to the
domain validation process deployed by “Let’s Encrypt” (Let’s Encrypt, 2015) as illustrated in Figure
2.
Figure 2. Domain validation process as deployed by Let's Encrypt, Source: (Let’s Encrypt, 2015)
The  domain  owner  runs  the  Let's  Encrypt-Client  on  the  domains  machine,  afterwards  the  client
contacts the Let's Encrypt-Server (LES) and asks for a challenge. One challenge might be to provide a
certain resource under  a  specific  URI  and sign it  with the  private  key which  corresponds  to  the
validated public key which is validated. In Figure 2, the client is asked to provide the resource “ed98”
at https://example.com/8303 and sign it with the private key. The client software fulfils the challenge
as  requested by the LES,  which checks if  the  challenge's  outcome is  satisfying.  If  the  validation
succeeds, the domain owner has proven that he/she  has access to the domain (domain validation), has
access to the public and private key (key validation) and that the certificate (key pair) corresponds to
the tested domain. In context of Authcoin, a similar validation process can be performed as illustrated
in Figure 3. Since most keys inside the PGP WoT are used for encrypted email communication, the
users are interested in a correct binding between a public key and the email address stated in the key,
therefore we will use the validation of email accounts as an example.
Figure 3.  General validation/authentication process as deployed by Authcoin
As shown in Figure 3, Alice sends a challenge (“this is a challenge”) encrypted with Bob's public key
to Bob's email account. Bob is asked to fulfil the challenge, sign the response with his private key and
send it  back to  Alice.  Alice  checks the results  and can deduce (in  case  that  the  process  finished
successfully) the following three facts from the challenge and response: 1.) Bob has access to the
email account (account validation). 2.) Bob has access to the public and private key (key validation).
3.) The key pair corresponds to the tested email account (binding).
The validation requests and results of the validation processes are stored as part of the BC (described
in Section 3.8). Both, Alice and Bob, independently post the challenge and response to the BC.
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It is important to keep in mind that neither in the domain/certificate validation example nor in the
email account validation example the identity of the owner was verified, only that a certain entity
actually had access to the domain or email account at the time the Authcoin protocol was run and that
this entity had also access to the corresponding key pair. The authentication process is addressed later
in Section 3.4.
An  important  difference  between  the  domain  validation  process  described  earlier  and  the  email
account validation, is that this process is performed in both directions (bidirectional). Alice sends a
challenge to Bob and receives (hopefully) a matching response and Bob does the same when receiving
Alice's  challenge in  order to  also verify Alice's  mail  account.  As a result,  it  is  more difficult  for
malicious users to introduce fake keys into the system and maintain introduced malicious keys. A
major advantage of Authcoin's bidirectional validation processes is that they can be performed in an
automated manner and even on large scale. As a result, each domain, certificate or account can be
validated on a regular basis resulting in an improved overall security of the network. 
3.4 Authentication
After  validating  the  domains,  certificates  or  email  accounts,  the  problem  of  authentication  is
addressed.  Similar  to  the  validation  procedures  described  before,  Authcoin  relies  on  a  challenge-
response-mechanism for authentication. In this section, we will use simple example challenges which
might  be  used to  verify the  identity  of  an entity  which  is  linked to  a  public  key. More  detailed
explanations on challenges are provided later in Section 4.1.
Assuming the scenario that Alice and Bob went to the same school and have lost contact over the
years, but somehow Alice managed to retrieve Bob's public key with an email address using Authcoin
(it is also assumed that Alice has already performed the automated validation procedures as described
earlier). Alice wants to verify Bob and his key in order to ensure that the email account and the public
key belongs to Bob and not to somebody else. To do so, she sends a challenge to Bob and asks him to
send her a picture of himself holding a copy of the current issue of a specific newspaper. In this simple
example, it is plausible that Alice somehow knows what Bob might looks like and therefore is able to
decide whether the person on the image is Bob or not. Since Bob also wants to make sure that he is
really communicating with Alice, he verifies Alice in the same manner, resulting in a bidirectional
verification  of  both  participants.  Again,  as  already  mentioned  for  the  validation  procedure,  both
involved entities posts all information independently to the BC.
3.5 Revocations and Expirations
The following types of revocation and expiration are relevant for Authcoin:
3.5.1 Key Revocation
Currently, Authcoin's key revocation is handled as known from PGP (Callas et al. 2007). A key is
revoked by posting a key revocation certificate to the BC. In context of Authcoin, revoking a key is
done by posting the key revocation certificate to the BC. Future versions of Authcoin might extend the
protocol  with a more sophisticated approach using a combination of offline and online key pairs,
where the offline key pair can be used to revoke, update or replace the online key pair.
3.5.2 Signature Revocation 
Similar to the key revocation, a signature is revoked by adding a signature revocation certificate to the
BC. A signature revocation expresses a total loss of trust in the signed key.
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3.5.3 Key and Signature Expiration
Both, keys and signatures, have an expiration date. For security reasons, the lifetime of key pairs used
with Authcoin is limited to a maximum of 12 months, afterwards a new key pair has to be created, but
users can also decide to use shorter lifespans. Signatures either expire after a user-defined timespan
(max. 12 months) or when the signing key or the key which got signed expire. An expired key cannot
longer be used for V&A in context of Authcoin. Using the key outside Authcoin is still possible (even
though it is not recommended).
3.6 Key Recovery
Currently, Authcoin does not support any key recovery mechanisms. Therefore, as known from the
concept  of  the  PGP WoT,  a  lost  private  key  cannot  be  recovered.  An  alternative  approach  was
introduced by Certcoin, which deploys a shared secret (Shamir, 1979; Blakely, 1979) solution. A user's
private key secret is shared between a number of friends and at least two of them are required to
restore  the  secret  key (Fromknecht  et  al.  2014a;  Fromknecht  et  al.  2014b).  An advantage of  this
solution is the availability of a key recovery mechanism, but it comes with the downside of handling
additional keys and the requirement of sufficient trusted persons. Furthermore, for non-technical users,
the concept of public-key-cryptography alone is complicated enough; adding the concept of shared
secrets demands to much from non-security experts.
3.7 Key Lookup
Authcoin's key lookup is done by traversing the BC and searching for a key described by one of its
properties, such as the corresponding email address, a name, a key id, etc. Even though the BC might
grow up to several gigabytes of data, traversing through the BC is not a real performance issue, since
the lifespan of keys and signatures is limited to 12 months. Therefore, a key lookup only requires the
traversal through data of the past 12 months.
3.8 Storing Information
Authcoin utilizes a BC-based transaction database (storage concept behind Bitcoin (Nakamoto, 2008),
Ethereum (Buterin, 2014; Wood, 2014) and similar systems) as an underlying storage system which is
used to keep track of keys, challenges, responses, signatures and all other relevant information. BC-
based storage systems provide several desirable properties such as: decentralization (no trusted central
authority), distribution of data, fault tolerance, transparency and redundancy. Furthermore, it is not
possible to manipulate the BC as long as the majority of its users decide to do so. 
A BC consists, as the name suggests, of an (technically) unlimited number of blocks which are chained
together in a chronological order. Each block consists of transactions2 which are the actual data to be
stored in a BC. During the “mining"-process”, miners collect valid transactions, compute a proof-of-
work  and the  result  is  a  new block  which  can  be  added to  the  BC.  Each block  depends  on  its
predecessor block and therefore tampering and manipulating a block is quite difficult and requires an
infeasible recalculation of all successor blocks. 
For the ease of explanation, this paper assumes that Authcoin has its own, independent BC. But it is
also possible to utilize existing BCs for this purpose as done by Namecoin which is built on top of
Bitcoin and uses the same BC. Alternative projects as Ethereum (Buterin, 2014; Wood, 2014) maintain
their own, independent and customized chain.
2In case of Authcoin, transactions are the stored data records such as challenges, responses, etc.
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4 Security and Reliability
Section  3 provided only a general overview on Authcoin and did not discuss any security issues or
attacks on the system. The following section deals with exactly these topics, how to mitigate possible
attacks, prevent misuse of Authcoin and explains Authcoin's challenge-response concept in detail.
4.1 Challenges
Security and reliability of Authcoin heavily depend on the challenges chosen for the V&A of keys and
identities. Therefore, this part gives more detailed information on the challenge-response-concept and
related  security  issues  as  well  as  a  few  example  challenges.  Again,  PGP  and  email-based
communication are used as an example for the ease of explanation even though Authcoin is not limited
to this scenario.
4.1.1 Basic Challenges
In Section 3.3 as well as in Section 3.4, we discussed a special subtype of V&A (called local V&A)
were two entities either had or have at some point the possibility of direct personal interaction (e.g.
meeting each other in person). V&As without such an opportunity where it is not possible that the two
entities interact directly with each other, are called global V&As. In general we have to distinguish
three basic types of V&A: Local V&A with additional information (e.g. a side channel), global V&A
with additional information (e.g. a side channel) and global V&A without any additional information.
The easiest and most convenient category is a local V&A with additional information. Two examples
were provided in Section  3.3 and Section  3.4. Both participating entities had additional knowledge
about the other entity such as personal (old) information (name, parents, current/former address, date
of birth, etc.) or even an existing side-channel for exchanging information (e.g. alumni meetings).
Therefore, it is relatively easy to construct a personalized challenge-based on shared experiences or
information which is (in a best case) only known to both entities. The most common example of the
PGP WoT: “Two entities meet in person, verify each others key and prove their identity using their
identity cards or passports” belongs to this category as well as requesting an image of the passport
owner with its passport. In this case, the identity card or the passport is the additional information and
both parties have decided to trust them as an authentication method (passports can be faked (e.g. by
the government itself) or stolen).
A bit more challenging to handle are global V&As with additional information or a side-channel. An
example scenario might look like this: Alice is a well known blogger and Bob a reader who wants to
communicate with Alice for some reason. Unfortunately, Alice and Bob do not know each other and
do not have any common acquaintances. Bob found a public key with Alice's email address and her
name in the Authcoin system. He wants to make sure that the key really belongs to Alice and therefore
creates a challenge: “Alice if this your key, please use the following keyword X in your next blog
post”. The challenge is sent to the email address stated in the key and posted to the BC. Alice fulfils
the challenge by using the keyword in her next blog post and sends the response to Bob. Bob reads the
post and publishes it. For the local V&A with additional information as well as the global V&A with
additional information, the security of the challenge highly depends on the security (e.g. tamper proof)
of the side-channel or the fact that the additional information is only known to the verifier and the
verification target but not to someone else.
Much more difficult are global V&As without any additional information. Bob wants to communicate
with Alice and found a public key of Alice in Authcoin's BC. Unfortunately, Bob has no additional
information about Alice (Image, etc.) and no side-channel as in the previous example. In this case,
Authcoin can only provide validation but no authentication (at least with the current set of challenges,
but this might change in the future). Using the process described in Section 3.3, it is still possible to
validate  that  the  entity  behind  the  public  key  has  access  to  the  specified  email  account  and the
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corresponding private  key, but  it  is  not  possible to  determine whether this entity  is  Alice or  not.
Nonetheless, Alice and Bob can decide to give up some security guarantees and decide to use a non-
verified additional information such as an identity card. In this case, Bob has no way to either check
whether the image on the ID belongs to Alice (since he does not know what Alice looks like), nor
verify that the ID is not  faked (maybe even by the government to fool Bob) or stolen.  But since
Authcoin  stores  all  challenges  and  responses  in  the  BC,  potential  malicious  users  risk  exposure
through other genuine users while analysing the BC.
It is important to note that for the three V&A types discussed above a signature between two keys is
only  created  in  case  that  the  validation  process  (validation  signature)  or  authentication  process
(authentication signature) was successful. A failed validation or authentication is also documented in
the BC. By not creating signatures for failed validations or authentications, Authcoin stays compatible
for already existing PGP systems without introducing new signature types (the distinction between
V&A signature is an internal attribute of Authcoin). In contrast to current authentication processes
such as  known from the PGP WoT, Authcoin requires  most  validations  and authentications  to  be
performed in both directions (bidirectional) instead of unidirectional.  Bidirectional V&A results in
more frequent examination of each key, identity, domain or certificate and makes it more difficult for
malicious entities to stay undetected (more on malicious entities in Section 4.2). Another advantage of
Authcoin V&A approach is a lower threshold for users to participate in V&A since it is not necessarily
required to meet the verification target in person (even though this is still possible and just a different
type of  challenge).  Finally, automating the validation process  provides  each user  with the  unique
possibility to validate all existing entities of the Authcoin-system on its own without relying on any
transitive relations (nevertheless it is possible for authentications if desired by the user).
As already shown through the mentioned examples above, Authcoin is not fixed to a specific type of
challenge. Instead it is meant to be as flexible and extensible as possible and use all kind of challenges.
Therefore, the results of future research on challenges can easily be integrated in Authcoin, especially
new challenges  which are  more  secure  and harder  to  manipulate  than the existing ones.  Another
advantage  of  this  approach is  that  Authcoin can also be deployed in other  scenarios  as  the  ones
described above, for example in IoT (Internet of Things) environments.
4.1.2 Protecting Privacy
Storing challenges and responses in a transparent and publicly available BC might result  in some
issues regarding to the users privacy. In order to address this issue, Authcoin supports a special type of
private challenge. In this case, the challenge and response are stored in an encrypted manner in the BC
and the keys are only known to the involved parties. To prevent abuse of this opaque privacy enhanced
challenge, Authcoin does not create a signature for such successfully passed challenges and only stores
the created challenge and response as part of the BC. Thereby it is still possible for other users to see
that  a  successful  V&A took place,  but  malicious users  cannot  create  signatures  based on opaque
challenges which cannot be verified by others. This transparency property is an important feature of
Authcoin since it also allows uninvolved users to track the origins of a signature.
4.1.3 Adaptable Level of Required Security
As mentioned earlier, the challenges influence the overall security and reliability of the system. As a
result, adapting the requirements for the deployed challenges leads to a different level of provided
security. In  some scenarios,  deploying  only  validation  mechanisms might  be  enough for  a  given
purpose. In other scenarios, it might be necessary to combine different challenges based on different
identifiers in order to provide a maximum level of security and reliability. Many other scenarios lie in
between these two extrema. For example in some cases, a picture with the verification target and its
passport (including picture, etc.) provides a reasonable level of security, in other cases a passport does
not proof anything since possible adversaries can create any desired passport identity. 
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A further security improvement might be to utilize biometric identifiers which are more difficult to
fake. Commonly used biometric identifiers are fingerprints, eyes (retina or iris recognition), voice,
face (face recognition) or DNA. Biometric identifiers can either be used to derive a new key pair from
the identifier (Bjorn, 2000) or get included into the new key pair in  addition  to  the  traditional
identifiers. Adding biometric identifier to the key pair establishes additional bindings between the key
owner and the key pair.
It is important to keep in mind that users cannot solely rely on successfully passed challenges. They
have to analyse and examine the challenges used during the V&A process of a key and have to decide
on their own if these challenges provide a suitable level of reliability and security or not.
4.2 Malicious Entities
As known from our experiences with the PGP WoT, the biggest security issue of a decentralized trust
system are malicious users (e.g. sybil nodes). Authcoin implements several restrictions and mitigations
concepts in order to prevent malicious users from damaging the system and identifying them as soon
as possible. Similar to the PGP WoT and comparable solutions, Authcoin cannot prevent (at least not
at the moment) the participation of sybil nodes. Nevertheless, due to the adaptable challenge-response
mechanism and the transparent storage of all information, it is much more difficult for an adversary to
keep its malicious nodes undetected.
The first line of defence is the challenge-response-mechanism which can (if used correctly) detect and
identify sybil nodes since they might not be able to successfully pass the proposed challenges. Making
challenges as tamper-proof as possible makes it much more difficult for sybil nodes to stay undetected.
For example, the verifier might not only ask for an image of the verification target with its passport,
but also with an apple in his/her right hand and his/her left eye closed. Adding further constraints
makes  it  more  difficult  for  an  adversary  to  use  existing  images  of  the  verification  target  and
manipulate them according to the challenge especially under time restrictions. In addition, a list of
several constraints makes it also significantly more difficult to create fictional users (with fictional
computer generated avatars) in short time, which fulfil the challenge in a satisfying manner. Using
images of existing persons from the Internet in combination with arbitrary names is also dangerous for
an attacker since the images are stored in the publicly available BC and might be discovered by other
users which know the person on the image and her/his real name. Figure 4 illustrates how users can
detect such a mismatch. Furthermore, future research on applicable challenges might lead to more
secure  and  tamper-proof  challenges  which  make  it  nearly  impossible  for  sybil  nodes  to  stay
undetected.
Figure 4.  Identify mismatch in the block chain
Deploying a  mandatory  bidirectional  authentication  process  is  an additional  burden for  malicious
users.  It  might  be still  possible  to  create  a  collective of  sybil  nodes with signatures  between the
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participating  entities,  but  as  soon as  nodes  outside this  collective interact  with  the  collective  the
probability of exposure increases.
As a result of limiting keys lifespan to a maximum of 12 months, maintaining such sybil collectives is
much more time consuming than before. In case of the PGP WoT, it is trivial to create an arbitrary
number of keys with unlimited life span, connect them among each other and then create outgoing
signatures to legitimate nodes and also might receive some back signatures from unreliable verifiers,
which  finally  results  in  a  permanent  incorporation  of  the  sybil  collective  in  the  “web  of  trust”.
Moreover, the transparent nature of Authcoin makes it also easier to identify unreliable verifiers which
do not take the V&A process seriously and identify them (and their actions) as not trustworthy.
Another approach for detecting and mitigating malicious nodes are automated V&A requests which
will be introduced in the following section in more detail.
4.3 Automated Validation and Authentication Requests
Automated validation and authentication requests  (VARs)  are  automatically  and randomly created
during the mining process (more details on mining in Nakamoto (2008)) of a new block of the BC (as
illustrated earlier in Figure 1). The number of generated VARs depends on the number of existing and
still valid (not expired, revoked, etc.) keys in the system. An automated VAR expresses the desire of
the system to validate  and/or  authenticate  a  randomly chosen entity  inside the system.  VARs are
publicly stored as  a  part  of  the  BC and can be fulfilled by Authcoin's  users.  Deploying such an
automated requests-mechanism results in several benefits compared to existing solutions:
Firstly, the approach of automated VARs makes it  much easier to break into sybil collectives “by
accident”  and  expose  them  as  such  in  case  they  fail  the  validation  or  authentication  process.
Identifying one sybil  node leads  to  questioning all  other  nodes which claim to have successfully
validated and/or authenticated the sybil node and identifying these nodes either also as sybil nodes or
at  least  as  unreliable verifiers.  Due to VARs and the bidirectionality  of authentications,  it  is  also
possible to increase the number of V&As for each key, resulting in higher probabilities of detecting
malicious users.
Especially in context of certificate and email account validation, VARs result in interesting application
scenarios: Issuing large amounts of validation requests and storing the results in the BC, results in a
large regularly updated dataset containing information about the binding between a certificate/key and
a website/email account over time. Therefore it is possible to track which certificate/key was used at
which date and time for which website/email account. Even more important in context of the Snowden
revelations and highly sophisticated targeted attacks: It is possible to view certificates/keys (illustrated
in Figure 5) from different points of view; can Alice and Bob “see” the same certificate for a given
website even though Alice accesses the website from the US and Bob from China (Great Firewall)?
Is this the case for all users from China or only for Bob? Does the certificate match the website?
Combining this approach with a browser-plugin results in an interesting security feature even for the
average Internet users and not only security experts. Especially since the fulfilment of the validations
can be done automatically by a client on the user’s devices without any interaction from the users.
Moreover, using email account validation, it is also possible to keep track which email addresses are
still technically reachable and operated and which are already dead. As shown by Leiding and Dähn
(2016),  about  40  percent  of  the  PGP WoT's  email  addresses  (associated  with  the  PGP keys)  are
technically  not  reachable  any  more  without  anybody  noticing.  By   using  Authcoin's  validation
procedure, it is possible to monitor which addresses are still technically reachable (does not mean that
anybody uses them any more).
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Figure 5. Identifying certificate manipulations through Authcoin
In order to make it more difficult to misuse the VAR-mechanism, we introduced some restrictions: For
example, VARs can not be issued by users manually, instead they are generated automatically after a
new block was added to the BC. If malicious users could create any desired number of requests on
their own (and fulfil them afterwards with keys under their control), the relevance of the automatically
generated  requests  would  be  almost  zero.  In  order  to  avoid  similar  tactics  for  the  automatically
generated VARs, a hash-based selection algorithm decides whether a specific user is allowed to fulfil
the VAR or not. The selection algorithm simply calculates the hash of the concatenation of the VAR
and  the  (possible)  verifier's  key.  If  the  binary  presentation  of  the  result  starts  with  a  certain
combination (e.g. a 1 or a 0; 10 or 11, etc.) the user is allowed to fulfil the VAR, otherwise not. This
decision seems to be random, but that is exactly the idea behind it. The algorithm is used to make it
more difficult for malicious users to fulfil VARs with other keys under their control. Of course this
approach  can  be  undermined,  but  it  increases  an  attackers  cost  of  not  getting  exposed.  Besides
limitations through the selection-algorithm, it is also necessary that the key used to fulfil the VAR
itself was created before the VAR in order to avoid that attackers create keys to fulfil the VAR after
they discovered it.
In future versions of Authcoin, the VAR-mechanism might be combined with an incentive system in
order to encourage users to fulfil VARs on a regular base (in case that is even necessary; besides that,
fulfilling validations does not require the user's interaction at all). The incentive system might be part
of an overall  trust metric concept  which not only includes the results of  V&As, but also rewards
behaviour that benefits the system (such as fulfilling VARs).
4.4 Bootstrapping
The bootstrapping process of Authcoin turns out to be rather simple. It does not matter if the first users
of Authcoin are genuine or not. In the long-term, the genuine users of the protocol will figure that out
and mark these three as not trustworthy and post the information to the BC.
4.5 Possible Attacks on Authcoin
As Authcoin uses a similar method for domain authentication as "Let's Encrypt", it is vulnerable to the
same attack vector. It is possible that an attacker runs an attack on the routing and/or DNS system to
the effect that for a short period of time the communication between the Let’s Encrypt server and the
machine of the domain in reality takes place between the Lets Encrypt server (LES) and a machine of
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the attacker. The machine of the attacker contacts the LES and asks for a challenge. The LES provides
such a challenge. The attacker receives the challenge, signs it with its own private key and provides it
under the proposed URL.  When the LES checks the response to the challenge,  again the LES is
directed to the machine of the attacker. As a result the verification of the challenge by the LES turns
out to be valid (with respect to the public key of the attacker). Thus, the LES provides the attacker
with a certificate where the public key of the attacker is certified to be the public key of the original
impersonated domain.
A requirement for a success of this attack is that the attacker can manipulate the network in such a
manner  that,  for  a short  period of time,  the  LES believes  to be communicating with the  original
domain but instead communicates with the attacker. Admittedly, such an attack is difficult. However, if
such an attack would be impossible we would not need certificates for server authentication after all.
The protection offered by the Let’s Encrypt approach, however, easily can be improved: If several
validating  servers  provide  challenges,  the  attacker  must  impersonate  all  these  challenges.  This
improvement comes at the difficulty that any of the LES could launch a DoS attack against a user by
claiming that the response did not correctly match the challenge. In  case  of  Authcoin,  such  an
unjustified claim can easily be detected since both parties (verifier and the verification target) post the
challenge  and responses  independently  to  the  BC.  So  as  a  result,  under  certain  very  difficult  to
achieve circumstances it is possible to attack the Authcoin protocol, but since this an attack on very
fundamental parts of the Internet’s infrastructure it cannot be prevented by Authcoin.
5 Conclusion
Current  public  key infrastructure  solutions  come along with several  downsides  and disadvantages
resulting in the need of a new approach which fixes the existing problems. Authcoin aims to do that in
a decentralized and distributed manner using a BC-based storage system and a redefined challenge-
response-based V&A process for public keys, certificates and email accounts. Due to its transparent
nature and public availability, it  is possible to track the whole V&A history of each entity in the
Authcoin system which makes it much more difficult to introduce sybil nodes and prevent such nodes
from getting detected by genuine users. In addition, Authcoin provides some additional features such
as automated VARs and a certificate/email account monitoring system which enhances the overall
security. Finally, due to  the flexible challenge-response-scheme,  the level  of  security  provided by
Authcoin can be easily adapted and allows Authcoin to be deployed in various application scenarios. 
6 Future Work
Besides implementing and testing Authcoin under real world conditions, future work might also focus
on leveraging the concepts of the V&A process. There is no necessity for key pairs to be part of the
V&A process. Instead, Authcoin could be generalized and used for all kind of V&A.
In addition, Authcoin's security might be improved through the development of new, more tamper-
proof challenges which might include biometric identifiers such as fingerprints and voice-samples or
iris and retina information. Furthermore, Authcoin might benefit from deploying trust metrics on top
of it  using the data records which are part of the BC in order to provide an estimation of a keys
trustworthiness.
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